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THE CATHOLIC LAWYER
RECENT DECISIONS
Religion and "Benevolence"
The Court of Appeals of New York State
has recently handed down a decision which
should be of high significance to anyone
interested in how the oft-times enigmatic
subject of religion is regarded by the law.
The defendants in People v. LeGrande,
309 N.Y. 420, 131 N.E. 2d 712 (1956),
were charged with fraudulently obtaining
money for a pretended charitable or benev-
olent purpose in violation of section 934 of
the Penal Law. Six defendants, clothed in
the garb of an indistinguishable religious
order, and armed with a certificate of au-
thority to solicit funds on behalf of the
New Day Holy Church of God, a religious
corporation properly organized under the
Religious Corporations Law, were found
to have contributed but $2.50 a day to the
pastor of their church, while retaining the
balance collected.
The Appellate Division reversed a con-
viction in the Kings County Court on the
basis of insufficient evidence.' In reversing
the order of the Appellate Division, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals touched only
lightly upon the question of evidence, and
concentrated more upon its significant an-
swer to a defense which was, on the basis
of prior litigation under section 934, a
novel one.
The defendants maintained that their
activities did not rest within the scope of
section 934, because these activities were
neither "charitable" nor "benevolent," but
religious. In the opinion of Judge Van
Voorhis:
1 People v. LeGrande, 285 App. Div. 1156, 140
N.Y.S. 2d 206 (2d Dep't 1955).
It would be a contradiction in terms to hold
that the object of the Christian religion, in
its broadest connotation, is not "benevolent."
In comparison to the more prevalent
concept of religion, this certainly was inter-
preting religion in its "broadest connota-
tion." Generally, "religion" has been re-
garded by the courts as a vertical sort of
contact between man and his God, rather
than as a vehicle for the more horizontal
"benevolence," as it is commonly known,
between men. It has been treated as being
more concerned with ". . . the observance
of all ordinances and ceremonies, which are
engaged in with the sole and avowed object
of honoring God," 2 than with the humani-
tarian concept of "love of neighbor." This
concept has prevented a group of Christian
Scientists from obtaining a charter for a
place of public worship, on the ground that
their purpose was "not merely to inculcate
a creed, or to establish a form of worship,
but ... also for the treatment and cure of
disease .... ,, 3
Antithetical interpretations of the word
"benevolence" also exist. One view is that
it is found in a form of good will, the other
that it exists only in good works. Under
the former view, the tenets of Christianity
would naturally designate religion as "be-
nevolent"; but under the latter, the most
fervent faith in the dignity of man would
not suffice. Thus, the dissemination of theo-
sophical ideas has been held not "benevo-
2 Chase v. Cheney, 58 Il1. 509, 11 Am. Rep. 95,
103 (1871); see also 45 AM. JUR. 723, and the
definition of "religion" in BLACK, LAW DICTION-
ARY 1455 (4th ed. 1951).
3 Re: First Church of Christ, Scientist, 205 Pa.
543, 55 Atl. 536 (1903).
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lent," within the limited, horizontal mean-
ing.4 Nor do the normal, benevolent
activities of a church group satisfy the
term5 when it is reduced to the level of
humanitarianism, unaffected by the exist-
ence of a Deity through whom humani-
tarianism is made worthwhile.
However, in view of the many altruistic
activities in which Church agencies are en-
gaged, it would seem that even where the
meaning of "benevolence" is restricted to the
horizontal level of humanitarianism, reli-
gion would still be classified as "benevo-
lent." It is significant that Black's Law
Dictionary includes hospitals within the
category of "religious houses."' 6 And cer-
tainly, when an organization dedicated to
the welfare of dumb animals can be deter-
mined "benevolent," 7 religious societies
and their more humane activities would
seem to come within the term.
The present section 934 is the result of
a long and somewhat clouded conflict. Be-
fore 1851, its construction would have
found little concern with such terms as
"charitable" or "benevolent."
Originally in New York, one who con-
tributed to charitable or benevolent pur-
poses was considered as giving at his own
risk. The anomalous case of People v.
Clough (1837)8 held that the obtaining of
charitable donations by the use of false
pretenses was not indictable, citing the pre-
4 New England Theosophical Corp. v. Boston, 172
Mass. 60, 51 N.E. 456 (1898).
5 Methodist Episcopal Church Baraca Club v.
City of Madison, 167 Wis. 207, 167 N.W. 258
(1918).
6 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (4th ed. 1951).
7 Pitney v. Bugbee, 98 N.J. 116, 118 Atl. 780
(1922).
8 17 Wend. 351, 31 Am. Dec. 303 (N.Y. 1837).
amble of the English statute,9 which said
that the purpose of the section was to
punish those who committed frauds ". .. to
the great injury of industrious families,
and to the manifest prejudice of trade and
credit.... "
England herself later abandoned that
preamble and the limitation that it im-
plied. 10 New York found herself alone
among the states of the union in constru-
ing the statute so narrowly."
Aggravating the effect of the Clough de-
cision, which one authority has called a
"blunder," 12 was the presence of laws mak-
ing begging illegal, and the absence of
licensed charitable soliciting agencies. Thus,
an application of the statute to charity
frauds would have been viewed as a sanc-
tion of foolhardy beneficence, serving only
as encouragement to lawbreakers. As Judge
Cowen stated in the Clough case:
The exercise of the virtue of charity has
practically been left.. .upon the basis of the
mere moral duty.. .The virtue is sufficiently
cold, inquisitive, and scrupulous to be safe
without the protection of the criminal law.
The duty of the donor is one of imperfect
obligation, and I am not aware that the beg-
gar's duty... is anything more. I should even
doubt whether an action for money had and
received would lie to recover back a char-
itable advance made on a false pretense. 13
However, in 1851, New York achieved
by statute what the other states had already
9 30 Geo. II, c. 24.
10 6&7 Geo. V, c. 50.
11 See Strong v. State, 86 Ind. 208, 44 Am. Rep.
292 (1882); State v. Swan, 55 Wash. 97, 104 Pac.
145 (1909); Commonwealth v. Whitcomb, 107
Mass. 486 (1871).
12 2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW §467 (9th ed. 1923).
13 People v. Clough, 17 Wend. 351, 31 Am. Dec.
303 (N.Y. 1837).
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done by sensible construction. Retaining
the old statute 14 that it had so narrowly
construed, it expressly provided, in a new
section, that the use of false pretenses to
obtain money "for any alleged charitable or
benevolent purpose" constituted a crime.1 5
Thus, it now apears that the spirit of
beneficence is protected from injury by sec-
tion 934. It is not so much the pretense that
the statute exists to censure, as it is the
manner and form of the pretense, which is
reprehensible because of the respectability
of the institution which the malefactor pur-
ports to represent.
The liberal construction of "benevo-
lence" by the court in the LeGrande deci-
sion did not adhere to the rule that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed. This
liberality of interpretation was unfettered
by more stringent construction established
in other fields of the law, which had here-
tofore been influenced by very different
statutory motivation, or by policy consid-
erations foreign to those which are germane
to the enforcement of a penal law. The
meaning of "benevolent" has often been an
issue in tax exemption cases, wherein ex-
emptions are not customarily enlarged by
construction; 16 and statutes which allow
devises to "benevolent" groups to elude the
rule against perpetuities 17 are likewise strin-
gently construed as to such terms.
But the most common souce for study-
ing the use of the word "benevolence" is
found in the field of charitable trusts. When
14 Now N. Y. PENAL LAW §932.
15 Laws of New York 1851, c. 144, p. 268.
16 See Methodist Episcopal Church Baraca Club
v. City of Madison, 167 Wis. 207, 167 N.W. 258
(1918).
17 See deWolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 469, 21 N.W.
615 (1884).
used with "charity," a "benevolent" devise
will be effectuated, but it is then narrowed
by context. As one opinion stated:
Whatever... may be the meaning.., of the
word "benevolence" by itself, there can be
no doubt that when used in connection with
"charity".., it is synonymous with it.18
In this manner "benevolence" assumes
what one judge has called a "latitudinarian
meaning." 19 Used so often with "charity,"
it loses its own distinct meaning. It is no
longer a begettor of charity, but merely a
symptom of it.
But even in the case of charitable trusts,
there are ways in which benevolence may
be distinguished. 20 A New York court has
held that when there is no disjunctive
("or") or conjunctive ("and") between
"charitable" and "benevolent," the latter
will be given a different, and more exten-
sive, meaning. In construing section 17 of
the Decedent Estate Law, which limits the
devising of an estate to "any benevolent,
charitable [etc.] ... society . . ." to one-half
of the testator's estate if he dies survived by
a wife, the court held that, because there
was no conjunctive or disjunctive between
the two words, the Odd Fellows could be
considered separately as a benevolent asso-
ciation. 21
Upon occasions when the courts have
been able to isolate "benevolence," they
have attributed to it a much more compre-
18 Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen 446, 470 (Mass.
1865); see also Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412,
42 Am. Rep. 444, 445 (1882); Jones v. Haber-
sham, 107 U.S. 174, 184, 185 (1882) (dictum).
19 Beasley, J., in DeCamp v. Dobbins, 31 N.J. Eq.
694 (1879).
20 See People v. Powers, 147 N.Y. 104, 41 N.E.
432 (1895).
21 In re Watkin's Estate, 118 Misc. 645, 194 N.Y.
Supp. 342 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
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hensive meaning than "charity." The dis-
tinction was noted in a New York case:
... beneficence is the doing well, benevo-
lence the wishing or willing well, to others....
Charity, which originally meant the purest
love for God and man, is now almost uni-
versally applied to some form of alms-giv-
ing, and is much more limited in meaning
than benevolence. 22
Benevolence, then, is not measured by
its volume, but by its intensity. Unlike char-
ity, it does not sustain orphanages or poor-
houses, though it be probably the reason
for their existence. Transcending the legal
definition of "charity," it is more akin to
the charity found enumerated among the
theological virtues. Intangible though it
may be, New York has recognized its ex-
istence in religious activities under the Per-
sonal Property Law section 12, where it is
provided that gifts to "religious, educa-
tional, charitable, or benevolent uses shall
not be deemed invalid by reason of in-
definiteness or uncertainty. . ." In constru-
ing this statute, a case has held that the
grouping includes organizations ".... which
evince a general charitable and benevolent
purpose for the advancement of the public
welfare." 2 3
Despite cases holding that fraternal or-
ganizations are "benevolent" although not
charitable, the criterion for establishing the
real meaning of benevolence should be
more lofty. Mutual-aid groups have failed
to attain that designation. 24 The Court, in
the LeGrande case, seems to have recog-
22 In re Watkin's Estate, supra note 21 at 650, 194
N.Y. Supp. at 348, citing FERNALD, ENGLISH SYN-
ONYMS, ANTONYMS, AND PREPOSITIONS 120.
23 In re Breckwoldt's Estate, 176 Misc. 549, 551,
27 N.Y.S. 2d 938, 940-41 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
24 See State v. Dunn, 134 N.C. 663, 46 S.E. 949
(1904).
nized that benevolence is found on a higher,
less tangible level. The distinction made in
an earlier New York decision is cited:
In its popular acceptation a charitable cor-
poration is one that freely and voluntarily
ministers to the physical needs of those pe-
cuniarily unable to secure for themselves,
while a benevolent corporation is one that
ministers to all, and the purpose may be any-
thing that promotes the mental, physical or
spiritual welfare of man.25 [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
Having concluded that benevolence is
something other than almsgiving, that it
exists in deeper, less functionary concepts,
and that it is involved with the spiritual, it
becomes clear that benevolence is within
the domain of religious activity. Indeed,
Christian religious principles being what
they are, it would seem that even when
viewed only as a spiritual or theosophical
activity, religion should retain the refined
designation of "benevolence."
Having established that religious organi-
zations come within the term "benevolent"
as contained in section 934, there was no
need for the Court to consider whether re-
ligion also fulfills the term "charitable," as
contained in that section. Although its defi-
nition of "benevolent" succeeded in crystal-
lizing a hitherto cloudy point of law, there
is also ample authority to the effect that
religious activities are regarded as
"charitable."
Ever since the English statute of 43
Eliz., c. 4 (ii), legacies providing for the
propagation of Christian doctrine have
been held "charitable."' 26 Provisions in
25 Matter of Rockefeller, 177 App. Div. 786, 791,
165 N.Y. Supp. 154, 158 (1st Dep't 1917).
26 See Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 552
(Mass. 1867); Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 537
(1837).
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New York law, that a bequest of Roman
Catholic masses, or Jewish Jahrzeit, char-
acterized as "charitable," afford exceptions
to the rule against perpetuities,2 7 and
that gifts for religious purposes must be
limited to one-half of the estate if the testa-
tor leaves a wife,28 further demonstrate re-
ligion as "charitable." Masses and Jahrzeit
have also been held "charitable" so as to
pass to an indefinite beneficiary, under sec-
tion 12 of the Personal Property Law.29
The United States Internal Revenue Code
explicity states that contributions to corpo-
rations ". . . organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious ... purposes" are de-
ductible as "charitable contributions."' 30
Inclusion of the term "religious" within
the term "charitable" might seem some-
what academic since it appears that the
importance of the LeGrande decision rests
in the inclusion of the term with "benevo-
lence." The accomplishment of the latter
task alone was sufficient to convict the
defendants under section 934.
27 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 13(a).
28 N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 17; see In re McArdle's
Will, 147 Misc. 876, 264 N.Y. Supp. 764 (Surr.
Ct. 1933).
29 In re Breckwoldt's Estate, 176 Misc. 549, 27
N.Y.S. 2d 938 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §170(c).
PRAGMATISM (continued)
process of philosophical erosion the un-
alienable rights of man can be destroyed.
They will be destroyed if, largely through
the influence of pragmatism, the law-
makers, lawyers and judges of America
believe that law is mere will or command,
that it represents force, not reason, and
It is interesting to note that, in the popu-
larized "head-notes" which digest the per-
tinent points of law preceding the cases in
the unofficial reporter, there is no reference
to the part that the construction of "benevo-
lence" played in the LeGrande decision.
The reference being solely to "charity," it
is sufficiently unfortunate that the ratio
decidendi was mistaken; but the inadver-
tency also reflects a failure to comprehend
what one who is interested in the attitude
of the law towards religion would immedi-
ately perceive.
If the judicial opinion had regarded
"benevolence" as akin to charity, or as a
variant of humanitarianism, the error would
have been meaningless. But the opinion
did not state that the "brotherhood of man"
was exhaustive of the term "benevolent."
The significance of the LeGrande decision
inheres in the conclusion that the "father-
hood of God," as propounded in the Chris-
tian religion, endows the "brotherhood of
man" with the characterization of "benevo-
lent." Thus, legal cognizance is taken of a
paradox that the Church has recognized
since its beginning; that just as a government
exists of laws, and not of men, so may a
belief remain benevolent per se, despite the
fraudulent uses to which it is dedicated.
that there is no such thing as natural law.
If the people come to believe this of the
law they will hate the law and the only
government possible will be that of a brutal
tyranny with a gestapo in every block. For
men support the law not because of fear,
but because they believe it stands for
reason.
